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Students Brief 
JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, 1883 - 1916 - THE MAN BEHIND THE NAME 
by R H G r i e v e , Department o f Economics 
U n i v e r s i t y o f S t r a t h c l y d e 
On t h e 5 t h June t h i s y e a r t h e r e f a l l s t h e h u n d r e d t h a n n i v e r s a r y of t h e b i r t h 
of J o h n M a y n a r d K e y n e s - Lord K e y n e s of T i l t o n - t h e g r e a t e s t and m o s t 
i n f l u e n t i a l e c o n o m i s t of t h i s c e n t u r y . H i s i s one of t h e few n a m e s of 
e c o n o m i s t s f a m i l i a r t o t h e g e n e r a l p u b l i c . T h a t t h i s i s s o , n e a r l y f o r t y 
y e a r s a f t e r h i s d e a t h , i s an i n d i c a t i o n of t h e e n o r m o u s i m p a c t w h i c h h i s 
i d e a s have had on economic t h e o r y and p o l i c y . S i n c e t h e p u b l i c a t i o n i n 1936 
of h i s Genera l Theory of Employment, I n t e r e s t and Money a g r e a t p a r t of t h e 
i n t e l l e c t u a l e f f o r t of t h e e c o n o m i c s p r o f e s s i o n h a s b e e n d e v o t e d t o 
e x p l a i n i n g , e x t e n d i n g or a t t e m p t i n g t o e s c a p e from t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e 
w o r k i n g of t h e economic s y s t e m p r e s e n t e d i n t h a t work. In a c a d e m i c and i n 
p o p u l a r d i s c u s s i o n of unemployment and i n f l a t i o n t h e e p i t h e t " K e y n e s i a n " i s 
b a n d i e d a b o u t by t h e o r i s t s , j o u r n a l i s t s and p o l i t i c i a n s - a p p l i e d s o m e t i m e s 
a s a t e r m of c o m m e n d a t i o n , s o m e t i m e s a s a t e r m of a b u s e . The p u r p o s e of t h e 
p r e s e n t p i e c e i s t o convey some i m p r e s s i o n - a s i t may be g l e a n e d from h i s 
w r i t i n g s and f r o m t h e m e m o i r s of t h o s e who knew him - of t h e man b e h i n d t h e 
n a m e . I t i s o p p o r t u n e t o g i v e t h o u g h t t o K e y n e s and t o t h e n a t u r e of h i s 
c o n t r i b u t i o n n o t s i m p l y b e c a u s e t h i s h a p p e n s t o be h i s c e n t e n a r y y e a r , bu t 
p a r t i c u l a r l y b e c a u s e t h e s o c i a l d i s a s t e r of m a s s u n e m p l o y m e n t , t o t h e 
e l i m i n a t i o n of w h i c h h i s e n e r g i e s w e r e p a s s i o n a t e l y c o m m i t t e d , h a s a g a i n 
b e f a l l e n t h e w o r l d economy. 
The Family Background 
Maynard Ke ynes , a s a Cambr idge don and e c o n o m i s t , was i n h i s own c a r e e r t o 
f o l l o w a p a t h t a k e n b e f o r e h im by h i s f a t h e r , J o h n N e v i l l e K e y n e s . J N 
K e y n e s ( 1 8 5 2 - 1 9 4 9 ) , b o r n i n S a l i s b u r y of a m i d d l e - c l a s s n o n c o n f o r m i s t 
f a m i l y , a t t a i n e d a c a d e m i c d i s t i n c t i o n a t Cambr idge a s a p h i l o s o p h e r and an 
e c o n o m i s t . His F o r m a l L o g i c and The S c o p e and Method o f P o l i t i c a l Economy 
a r e m i n o r c l a s s i c s . S u b s e q u e n t l y he was f o r many y e a r s , a s t h e c a p a b l e 
o c c u p a n t of t h e p o s t of R e g i s t r a r y , r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of 
t h e U n i v e r s i t y ' s a f f a i r s . 
J N K e y n e s m a r r i e d i n 1881 an e a r l y Newnham g r a d u a t e , F l o r e n c e B r o w n , who 
had been h i s p u p i l . Mrs Keynes (1862-1958) was a d a u g h t e r of Dr John Brown, 
C o n g r e g a t i o n a l i s t m i n i s t e r of t h e Bunyan M e e t i n g House i n B e d f o r d , a 
d i s t i n g u i s h e d p r e a c h e r and s c h o l a r ( a u t h o r of w h a t i s s t i l l t h e b e s t and 
m o s t r e a d a b l e L i f e o f B u n y a n ) . M a y n a r d , i t i s r e c o r d e d , h e l d h i s 
g r a n d f a t h e r i n " i m m e n s e r e s p e c t " . T h e r e i s a S c o t t i s h l i n k i n t h a t Dr 
Brown, a l t h o u g h b o r n and b r o u g h t up in B o l t o n - l e - M o o r s , L a n c a s h i r e , was of 
A y r s h i r e d e s c e n t . Mrs K e y n e s was t o be i n h e r own r i g h t a C a m b r i d g e 
n o t a b l e : s h e was a c t i v e i n s o c i a l work , became an a l d e r m a n of t h e b o r o u g h , 
a J u s t i c e of t h e P e a c e , and mayor . 
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The Keynes c h i l d r e n - Maynard, t he e l d e s t , Margare t ( p i o n e e r of modern 
methods of care of the e lde r ly and wife of A V H i l l , phys io log i s t and Nobel 
p r izeman) and Geoffrey ( S i r Geoff rey Keynes, eminent as a surgeon and as a 
man of l e t t e r s ) were born i n to a secure and happy profess iona l home, in to a 
f a m i l y t r a d i t i o n , one f e e l s , of h i g h t h i n k i n g , of i d e a l s of s o c i a l 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and s e r v i c e . I t was a home t o which eminent Cambridge 
p e r s o n a l i t i e s - t he p h i l o s o p h e r s Henry Sidgwick and W E Johnson in 
p a r t i c u l a r - were f a m i l i a r v i s i t o r s . S i r Geoffrey, looking back more than 
e i g h t y y e a r s , g i v e s us a sense of t h e f a m i l y ' s l i f e a t Harvey Road. He 
w r i t e s t h a t home prov ided "an i d e a l a tmosphe re for a h igh ly i n d i v i d u a l 
i n t e l l i g e n c e l i k e my b ro the r ' s to develop, unfe t t e red by pa ren ta l dominance 
or p r e j u d i c e . Our p a r e n t s , as I now look back on them, had a l o v a b l e aura 
of p e r f e c t i n t e g r i t y and goodness w i t h o u t s t u f f i n e s s or pompos i ty ; they 
were a f f e c t i o n a t e without s e n t i m e n t a l i t y , and were carefu l not to i n t e r f e r e 
with the p e r s o n a l i t i e s of t h e i r c h i l d r e n , while always ready to fo s t e r any 
worthwhile i n t e r e s t s as soon as they discerned them". Throughout h i s l i f e 
Maynard's r e l a t i o n s with parents remained very c lo se . 
Eton and King's 
The young Maynard Keynes proceeded by t h e cus tomary e d u c a t i o n a l s t a g e s ; 
l o c a l p r e p a r a t o r y s c h o o l , p u b l i c s c h o o l (Eton on a s c h o l a r s h i p ) and 
U n i v e r s i t y ( i n h i s c a s e , of c o u r s e , Cambridge) .The Eton y e a r s b rought 
o u t s t a n d i n g s u c c e s s , and as i s e v i d e n t from h i s l e t t e r s , g r e a t en joyment . 
Innumerable p r i ze s in Mathematics and Class ics f e l l to him. He reve l l ed in 
t he Eton l i f e . He deba ted and wro te p a p e r s on such s u b j e c t s as mediaeva l 
Lat in poetry , the c h a r a c t e r s of the S t u a r t monarchs, the d i f fe rence between 
East and West. He ac ted , he rowed (though not with conspicuous success) and 
he performed v a l i a n t l y a t t he n o t o r i o u s w a l l game. He d i s p l a y e d n a t u r a l 
q u a l i t i e s of l e a d e r s h i p and ach ieved " the g r e a t e s t t r i umph open t o an 
Etonian", e l ec t i on to the socie ty known as Pop. I t was a soph i s t i c a t ed and 
c o n f i d e n t young man, w e l l aware t h a t he was t he p o s s e s s o r of r emarkab l e 
t a l e n t s , who went up in October 1902 on an Open S c h o l a r s h i p to King 's 
College, Cambridge. 
He read for a degree in Mathematics, but c e r t a i n l y did not confine himself 
to t h a t f i e l d . Philosophy was a p a r t i c u l a r enthusiasm. His i n t e r e s t s were 
wide and the range of h i s a c t i v i t i e s ex tens ive . He was e lec ted Pres ident of 
t he L i b e r a l Club. He became P r e s i d e n t of the Union. A l e t t e r t o an Eton 
f r i e n d a t Oxford, w r i t t e n i n c i d e n t a l l y in h i s f i r s t term a t Cambridge, 
v iv id ly conjures up an extremely ene rge t i c undergraduate l i f e : 
"I have never enjoyed mysel f so much b e f o r e . I have very much 
increased my knowledge of the a f f a i r s of t h i s world and even more 
of the n e x t . 
I know n i c e p e o p l e . I have bought over f i f t y books t h i s t e r m . I 
row hard every afternoon without excep t ion , and I never go to bed. 
What more can heaven offer me? 
Take my programme l a s t Sunday evening. Immediately a f t e r ha l l I 
went t o a T r i n i t y Essay S o c i e t y and heard a most b r i l l i a n t s a t i r e 
on C h r i s t i a n i t y . From t h e r e I went to an i n f o r m a l p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
debat ing soc ie ty of i n t e r e s t i n g people where I stayed t i l l nearly 
t w e l v e ; then I went to see Monty James where I s t a y e d t i l l one; 
from t h e r e I went on t o a n o t h e r man w i t h whom I t a l k e d t i l l h a l f 
pa s t f o u r . At h a l f pa s t seven I go t up and read the l e s s o n in 
Chapel . I had four h o u r s ' work t h a t morning , and rowed ha l f a 
cou r se in t he a f t e r n o o n . In t he even ing I went as a v i s i t o r to 
55 
the Political Society to hear a paper on the Jesuits.... and so 
on." 
A significant event of Keynes' undergraduate days was his introduction, 
after vetting by Lytton Strachey and Leonard Woolf, to the select and secret 
discussion society which went by the name of "The Apostles". The spirit and 
fellowship of the Society proved very congenial. The Apostles saw 
themselves as seekers after truth - truth at all costs, without regard to 
tradition or convention. It must be said that a certain intellectual 
arrogance characterised the Society, a sense of being an elite, possessed of 
exceptional understanding and wisdom. Many years later (1938), with mature 
appreciation of the naivity of the Apostles' philosophy, Keynes was to 
write: "We had no respect for traditional wisdom or the restraints of 
custom. We lacked reverence .... for everything and everyone. It did not 
occur to us to respect the ordinary accomplishment of our predecessors in 
the ordering of life (as it now seems to me to have been) or the elaborate 
framework which they had devised to protect this order". Despite the 
moderation of attitude implied by that appraisal an iconoclastic element 
remained strong in Keynes, as did a confident belief in his superiority of 
vision. The gusto with which in the General Theory (1936) he demolished 
traditional economic doctrines recalls the radical enthusiasm of the 
Society. 
Membership of the Society brought Keynes not only intellectual excitement, 
it brought him also lasting friendships. The group of close friends around 
Lytton Strachey which included Keynes, together with the Stephen sisters, 
Virginia and Vanessa, and the painter Duncan Grant, subsequently formed the 
nucleus of "Bloomsbury", that famous, or notorious, coterie of intellectuals 
and artists. The values of Bloomsbury were those of the Society. Until his 
marriage Keynes' social life was centred on this group and there he found 
affection and love. Later, although relations were less close, friendship 
remained. 
In one aspect Keynes was quite untypical of Bloomsbury. The characteristic 
Bloomsbury attitude to the outside world was one of ironic detachment -
Bloomsbury preferred to concentrate on the attainment of good states of 
mind, on the contemplation of personal relationships and in aesthetic 
appreciation of objects of beauty. But Keynes cared, passionately, about 
the world and its problems. We find him throughout his adult life directing 
his attention to the discovery of rational and humane solutions to economic 
problems and applying his powers of polemic and persuasion to the task of 
getting these solutions adopted. Is it not reasonable to suppose that, 
despite the Society, despite Bloomsbury, the ethos of the family in which he 
was brought up - a moral inheritance from his parents - counted for a great 
deal in shaping Maynard Keynes' outlook on the world, in creating his 
urgent, activist spirit? Bertrand Russell, who knew Keynes and his 
background well, suggests as much. 
To return to Keynes' Cambridge career: in 1905 he took a First in 
Mathematics. He was undecided as to the future. The Bar was suggested but 
he eventually determined to prepare for the Civil Service examination. This 
plan involved him for the first time, in formal study of economics. He 
remarked in correspondence: "I find Economics increasingly satisfactory, 
and I think I am rather good at it. I want to manage a railway or organize 
a Trust... It is so easy and fascinating to master the principles of these 
things." He came second in the Civil Service examination in 1906 and 
entered the India Office. Keynes appears not to have found life in 
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W h i t e h a l l s u f f i c i e n t l y f u l f i l l i n g . When a f t e r two y e a r s , he r e c e i v e d an 
o f f e r of a L e c t u r e s h i p he threw up h i s p o s t a t the I n d i a Of f i ce and r e t u r n e d 
to Cambridge. 
Fellow of King's 
During t h e y e a r s 1906-1911 Keynes1 main i n t e l l e c t u a l e f f o r t s were devoted 
not t o economics but t o p h i l o s o p h y . In t he I n d i a Of f i ce pe r iod h i s s p a r e 
t i m e was occupied in t he p r e p a r a t i o n of a d i s s e r t a t i o n , on the t h e o r y of 
p r o b a b i l i t y , by which he hoped t o win a F e l l o w s h i p a t K ing ' s . Af te r he 
gained h i s Fel lowship in 1909 he continued work on the sub jec t , developing 
the d i s s e r t a t i o n i n t o a T r e a t i s e on P r o b a b i l i t y . Before t he book was 
completed o ther a c t i v i t i e s in tervened and i t did not appear u n t i l 1921. 
Any po r t r aya l of Keynes which neglected the P r o b a b i l i t y would be s e r i ous ly 
incomplete . The P r o b a b i l i t y was concerned with the theory of knowledge, and 
s u g g e s t e d , a g a i n s t t h e s c e p t i c i s m of Hume, a j u s t i f i c a t i o n of i n d u c t i v e 
r e a s o n i n g , and o f f e r e d a n o t i o n of p r o b a b i l i t y ( a s an a t t r i b u t e of a 
c o n c l u s i o n in r e l a t i o n to i t s p r e m i s e s ) of wider r e l e v a n c e than the 
numerical concept of the frequency theory. I t was a work of wide scope and 
e r u d i t i o n and made an o r i g i n a l and i m p o r t a n t c o n t r i b u t i o n and i t g i v e s 
Keynes a c l a im to d i s t i n c t i o n in the f i e l d of p h i l o s o p h y . Keynes did not 
c l a im to p r e s e n t a f i n a l and d e f i n i t i v e t r e a t m e n t of p r o b a b i l i t y and 
i n d u c t i o n . "There i s much h e r e " he s a i d in h i s P r e f a c e "which i s n o v e l , 
and, be ing n o v e l , u n s i f t e d , i n a c c u r a t e , or d e f i c i e n t . I propound my 
sys temat ic conception of t h i s subjec t for c r i t i c i s m and enlargement a t the 
hand of o t h e r s . . . " Perhaps i t i s f a i r t o say t h a t t he p l a c e of t he 
P r o b a b i l i t y in the h i s t o r y of ideas i s in acordance with the tenor of these 
remarks: i t may be descr ibed as an important and i n f l u e n t i a l con t r ibu t ion 
to a d e b a t e which c o n t i n u e s . I t may be n o t i c e d t h a t , y e a r s l a t e r in the 
General Theory, Keynes a n a l y s i n g b u s i n e s s d e c i s i o n making in r e s p e c t of 
p r o d u c t i o n , i n v e s t m e n t and a s s e t c h o i c e , drew on t h e i d e a s of t h e 
P r o b a b i l i t y , on h i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g of thought p r o c e s s e s in a world of 
u n c e r t a i n t y . The r o o t s of ' l i q u i d i t y preference ' l i e in the P r o b a b i l i t y . 
At Cambridge before the F i r s t World War Keynes was performing the d u t i e s of 
the economist , exact ly as described (1921) in h i s famous in t roduc t ion to the 
Cambridge Economic Handbooks: "The main task of the p rofess iona l economist 
now c o n s i s t s , e i t h e r in o b t a i n i n g a wide knowledge of r e l e v a n t f a c t s and 
e x e r c i s i n g s k i l l in t he a p p l i c a t i o n of economic p r i n c i p l e s to them, or in 
expounding the elements of h i s method . . . so t h a t , through h i s i n s t r u c t i o n , 
the number of t h o s e who can t h i n k for t h e m s e l v e s may be i n c r e a s e d . " The 
" a p p a r t u s of t h o u g h t " which was to hand seemed a d e q u a t e ; Keynes a p p l i e d 
t h i s a p p a r a t u s to monetary a f f a i r s , s p e c i f i c a l l y t o i s s u e s of Ind i an 
currency and f inance . He became an au tho r i t y on these m a t t e r s : they formed 
the sub jec t of h i s f i r s t book (1913) and he sa t on a Royal Commission (1913-
1914) which d e l i b e r a t e d on t h i s ques t ion . 
Shor t ly a f t e r the outbreak of the 1914-1918 war, Keynes was taken i n to the 
Treasury. He was to play an important execut ive ro l e in the management of 
war f i n a n c e . T reasu ry c o l l e a g u e s l a t e r r e c a l l e d : "Once t h e r e , h i s quick 
mind and i n e x h a u s t i b l e c a p a c i t y for work r a p i d l y marked out a kingdom for 
i t s e l f , and b e f o r e long he was a l e a d i n g a u t h o r i t y on a l l q u e s t i o n s of 
e x t e r n a l , and p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t e r - a l l i e d , f i n a n c e . " i t was Keynes who 
developed and appl ied the system of a l l i e d war loans , l a r g e l y from the angle 
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of c o n t r o l over t h e use of t h e s e b o r r o w i n g s and i t s r e l a t i o n t o our own 
needs and o rde r s for m a t e r i a l Equally absorbing was h i s i n t e r e s t in 
t h e p r o v i s i o n of f o r e i g n exchange r e s o u r c e s fo r UK e x p e n d i t u r e ab road . " 
Of f i c i a l bus iness took him to Pa r i s and to New York. He had a c lose escape 
in June 1916: bu t fo r a l a s t moment change of p lan he would have s a i l e d 
wi th Lord Kitchener for Russia aboard the i l l - f a t e d HMS Hampshire. 
Keynes a t t e n d e d t h e Peace Conference in P a r i s as t h e T r e a s u r y ' s c h i e f 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , w i t h power t o speak fo r t h e C h a n c e l l o r . At P a r i s he was 
engaged with immediate m a t t e r s of economic management - the p rov is ion ing of 
Germany, t h e c o n t r o l of i n t e r - a l l i e d f i n a n c e and t h e a l l o c a t i o n of food, 
m a t e r i a l s and sh ipping - r a t h e r than with the ac tua l making of the Trea ty . 
When the terms to be demanded of Germany became known Keynes (and not only 
Keynes) was appa l l ed . He made urgent e f f o r t s to modify the r e p a r a t i o n te rms 
and t o p r o v i d e f o r an i n t e r n a t i o n a l l oan t o Germany: Lloyd George was 
r e c e p t i v e , bu t Wi lson was n o t . To Keynes t h e f o l l y and h y p o c r i s y of t h e 
Trea ty , as he saw i t , was a mat te r of i n t e n s e personal concern. In a s t a t e 
of f r u s t r a t i o n and d e s p a i r he w r o t e ( t o h i s m o t h e r ) : " . . t h e Peace i s 
out rageous and imposs ib le and can br ing nothing but misfor tune behind i t . " 
To the Chancel lor : "..The Prime Minis te r i s l ead ing us a l l i n to a morass of 
d e s t r u c t i o n . The s e t t l e m e n t which he i s p r o p o s i n g fo r Europe d i s r u p t s i t 
economical ly and must depopulate i t by m i l l i o n s of persons . The new s t a t e s 
we a r e s e t t i n g up canno t s u r v i v e in such s u r r o u n d i n g s . How can peace be 
kept or the League of Nationas l i v e . How do you expect me to a s s i s t in t h i s 
t r a g i c f a rce any longe r , seeking to lay the foundat ion , as a Frenchman puts 
i t , ' d ' une g u e r r e j u s t e e t d u r a b l e ' . " He r e s i g n e d and l e f t P a r i s in June 
1919 before the Treaty was signed a t V e r s a i l l e s . 
The Radical Cr i t i c : "The Economic Consequences . . . ." 
Keynes ' s e n s e of o u t r a g e found e x p r e s s i o n in t h e i m m e d i a t e c o m p o s i t i o n of 
The Economic Consequences of the Peace, a m a s t e r p i e c e of po l emic which 
reached the publ ic before the end of 1919. His purpose was to lay bare the 
r e a l i t y of t h e " C a r t h a g i n i a n P e a c e " . He c h a r g e d t h e p e a c e m a k e r s -
Clemenceau, Lloyd George and Wilson - with d i s r ega rd of under takings made to 
Germany by t h e t e r m s of t h e A r m i s t i c e and w i t h t he i m p o s i t i o n of an 
unprecedentedly v i n d i c t i v e and h u m i l i a t i n g s e t t l e m e n t which th rea tened to 
des t roy her i ndus t ry and reduce her "to s e rv i t ude for a genera t ion" . The 
peacemake r s had f a i l e d in t h e i r t a s k . " I t was t h e t a s k of t h e Peace 
Conference to honour engagements and to s a t i s f y j u s t i c e ; but not l e s s to 
r e - e s t a b l i s h l i f e and to hea l wounds. These t a s k s were d i c t a t e d as much by 
p rudence as by t h e magnan imi ty which t h e wisdom of a n t i q u i t y approved in 
v i c t o r s . " 
Keynes may have u n d e r e s t i m a t e d t h e r e s i l i e n c e of t h e European economic 
s y s t e m , and i t may have been n a i v e t o suppose t h a t t he p o l i t i c i a n s r e a l l y 
intended to e x t r a c t from Germany the t r i b u t e they were o s t ens ib ly demanding, 
but t h e r e can be no doubt t h a t r e a s o n and magnanimi ty would have made a 
b e t t e r Peace. I t was in the f i ve years fo l lowing V e r s a i l l e s , while a t t emp t s 
were be ing made t o f o r c e r e p a r a t i o n s out of Germany, t h a t u n r e s t r a i n e d 
r e s o r t to t h e p r i n t i n g p r e s s by the Reichsbank d e s t r o y e d t h e v a l u e of t h e 
mark on the exchanges, thereby a c c e l e r a t i n g the pace of domestic i n f l a t i o n . 
As t o t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s of run-away i n f l a t i o n Keynes had spoken in no 
u n c e r t a i n t e r m s : "Lenin i s s a i d t o have d e c l a r e d t h a t t he b e s t way t o 
d e s t r o y t h e c a p i t a l i s t sys tem i s t o debauch t h e c u r r e n c y . . . Lenin was 
c e r t a i n l y r i g h t . There i s no s u b t l e r , no s u r e r means of o v e r t u r n i n g t h e 
e x i s t i n g b a s i s of s o c i e t y than to debauch the currency. The process engages 
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a l l t he h idden f o r c e s of economic law on the s i d e of d e s t r u c t i o n . . . " 
Keynes was wise in recognis ing t h a t the peacemakers were playing with f i r e . 
With a moderate and c o n s t r u c t i v e s e t t l emen t the co l l apse of the mark might 
not have o c c u r r e d ; w i t h o u t t h a t d i s a s t r o u s i n f l a t i o n would H i t l e r have 
come to power? The Economic Consequences put Keynes in the p u b l i c eye . 
The book was p u b l i s h e d in American, B e l g i a n , Ch inese , Danish , Dutch, 
I t a l i a n , Japanese, Roumanian, Russian, Spanish, Swedish and German e d i t i o n s . 
I t had a profound e f fec t on opinion. 
Keynes dec ided not to r e t u r n to f u l l - t i m e academic l i f e . He wished to 
i n f l u e n c e e v e n t s more d i r e c t l y , to p lay an a c t i v e p a r t in shaping p u b l i c 
o p i n i o n . He had g r e a t con f idence in h i s own powers ; he b e l i e v e d t h a t in 
h i s own f i e l d of e x p e r t i s e he p o s s e s s e d p a r t i c u l a r i n s i g h t . He would 
c o n t i n u e in t h e p a r t of t he a u t h o r of t he Economic Consequences, a f r e e -
l a n c e campaigner " s e t t i n g in motion t h o s e f o r c e s of i n s t r u c t i o n and 
imaginat ion which change opinion." "The a s se r t i on of t r u t h , the unvei l ing 
of i l l u s i o n " would be h i s o b j e c t i v e . What was r e q u i r e d , he b e l i e v e d , for 
the a t t a i n m e n t of r e a s o n a b l e s o l u t i o n s was " c l e a r a n a l y s i s of t h e r e a l 
f a c t s " : want of p rope r u n d e r s t a n d i n g , not s e l f - i n t e r e s t or l a c k of 
goodwil l , was genera l ly the obs t ac l e . In the years from 1919 he operated on 
opinion a t a l l l e v e l s - through the q u a l i t y and the popular p r e s s , through 
d i r e c t c o n t a c t w i t h t h o s e in high a u t h o r i t y and th rough h i s academic 
w r i t i n g s . He became Chairman of and c o n t r i b u t e d r e g u l a r l y to the L i b e r a l 
week ly The N a t i o n . He r e q u i r e d f i n a n c i a l i n d e p e n d e n c e . Tha t he 
s u c c e s s f u l l y ach ieved ( a f t e r an e a r l y r e v e r s e ) by o p e r a t i o n s in f o r e i g n 
exchange , commodi t i e s and s t o c k s and s h a r e s . Keynes o p e r a t e d not only on 
h i s own account: he was for many years Chairman of the National Mutual Life 
I n s u r a n c e Company and a member of t h e board of t h e P r o v i n c i a l I n s u r a n c e 
Company. He was a l s o Bursa r of K i n g ' s . His p e r s o n a l c a p i t a l and t h a t of 
the i n s t i t u t i o n s whose investments he guided grew with remarkable success . 
In the i n t e r - w a r years Keynes was in e f fec t conducting th ree ca ree rs - as an 
academic, as a f r e e - l a n c e j o u r n a l i s t and as a f i nanc i e r . F inanc ia l business 
i s said to have taken about half an hour (in bed) each morning. Weekends in 
term were spen t in Cambridge, the r e s t of the week in London. 
In t h e immedia te p o s t - w a r p e r i o d Keynes' a t t e n t i o n was c o n c e n t r a t e d on 
monetary q u e s t i o n s , both d o m e s t i c and i n t e r n a t i o n a l . The r e p a r a t i o n s 
problem remained u n s e t t l e d , although the Economic Consequences had had an 
important moderating e f f e c t on opinion. As the value of the mark col lapsed 
on the foreign exchanges and i n f l a t i o n raged d e s t r u c t i v e l y in Germany Keynes 
c o n t i n u e d t o work for a p r a c t i c a b l e s o l u t i o n . He proposed t h a t B r i t a i n 
should fo rego a l l c l a i m s to r e p a r a t i o n s ; du r ing the Ruhr c r i s i s he was 
h i m s e l f in touch w i t h t h e Chance l l o r in an e f f o r t to ach i eve agreement 
between Germany and the A l l i e s , but i t was not u n t i l 1924 t h a t a workab le 
arrangement was found. 
In Europe the s t a b l e monetary o rde r of t he p re -war gold s t a n d a r d had been 
destroyed by war and i n f l a t i o n . The £ was f l o a t i n g ; i t s value in terms of 
go ld (o r in t e r m s of t h e d o l l a r which had m a i n t a i n e d i t s p r e - w a r 
r e l a t i o n s h i p to gold) was well below the pre-war pa r i ty £1 = $4.86. Keynes 
had very d e f i n i t e i d e a s on p r a c t i c a l p o l i c y ; he c a l l e d c o n v e n t i o n a l 
p r e s u m p t i o n s i n t o q u e s t i o n and i n v i t e d fundamenta l r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n of 
t r a d i t i o n a l b e l i e f s . He propounded h i s views in academic a r t i c l e s , in 
a r t i c l e s in the p r e s s (p l aced w o r l d - w i d e ) , in h i s c o n t r i b u t i o n s to the 
a u t h o r i t a t i v e Manchester Guardian supplements on "Reconstruction in Europe" 
(which he ed i t ed ) and in h i s Tract on Monetary Reform. 
59 
Keynes' practical recommendation was consistently that "the objective of the 
authorities, pursued with such means as are at their command, should be the 
stability of prices". Inflation and deflation were both damaging and 
should be avoided. "...inflation is unjust and deflation is inexpedient. 
Of the two perhaps deflation is, if we rule out exaggerated inflations such 
as that of Germany, the worse; because it is worse, in an impoverished 
world, to provoke unemployment than to disappoint the rentier. But it is 
not necessary to weigh one evil against the other. It is easier to agree 
that both are evils to be shunned." 
It was consistent with that position that Keynes advocated dear money -
which, in the circumstances, he did not expect seriously to affect 
employment - to break the inflationary post-war boom in Britain. But he was 
strongly opposed to the application of deflationary measures for the 
purpose, not of controlling inflation, but of pushing down domestic prices 
for external reasons. He considered it foolish for a country to attempt to 
raise the external value of its currency by domestic deflation. (The 
mechanism supposed was that a reduction in wages and prices would affect 
exports and imports and thereby lead to appreciation of the domestic 
currency on the foreign exchange markets.) He cited the case of 
Czechoslovakia as an example of the unhappy consequences of pursuing an 
irrational objective - that of improving the exchange value of the Czech 
crown. "...it has cost her an industrial crisis and serious unemployment. 
To what purpose? I do not know.... Her finances were in equilibrium, her 
credit good, her foreign resources adequate, and no one could have blamed 
her for devaluing the crown, ruined by no fault of hers and inherited from 
the Hapsburg Empire. Pursuing a misguided policy in a spirit of stern 
virtue, she preferred the stagnation of her industries...." 
Keynes raised the question - an extremely radical question in the 1920's -
of the desirability of return to the rigidly fixed exchange rates of the 
gold standard. He was very conscious of the extreme difficulty and slowness 
of balance of payments adjustment via deflation which adherence to the gold 
standard would require. He charged conventional economic wisdom with giving 
insufficient attention to problems of adjustment, of thinking too much in 
terms of long run equilibrium. "But this long run is a misleading guide to 
current affairs. In the long run we are all dead. Economists set 
themselves too easy, too useless a task, if in tempestuous seasons they can 
only tell us that when the storm is long past the ocean is flat again." He 
took the view that stability of internal prices should be preferred to 
rigidity of the exchange rate. If realignment of domestic with 
international values should be required, he recommended devaluation rather 
than deflation. A regime of adjustable exchange rates was indicated. Not 
only should Britain not seek to re-establish the pre-war parity of the £, 
she should not seek to fix any permanent value of sterling in relation to 
gold. 
Despite Keynes' warnings, faith in the gold standard remained strong in the 
City and at Westminster. Speculation took the value of the £ to an 
artificially high level and in April 1925 the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
Mr Winston Churchill, announced Britain's return to gold at the pre-war 
parity of $4.86 to the £. At this parity the £ was overvalued, on Keynes' 
estimate, by about 10%; for balance of payments equilibrium, domestic 
prices would have to be brought down by two shillings in the pound. 
He launched a scathing attack. Did the Government, he asked in The Economic 
Consequences of Mr Churchill, not understand the implications? In taking 
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t h i s " s i l l y " d e c i s i o n , Mr C h u r c h i l l had been " g r o s s l y mis led by h i s 
e x p e r t s " . "I t h i n k t h e minds of h i s a d v i s e r s s t i l l d w e l l in t he imag ina ry 
academic w o r l d . . . where t he n e c e s s a r y a d j u s t m e n t s fo l l ow ' a u t o m a t i c a l l y ' 
from a ' sound ' p o l i c y by the Bank of England." Keynes s p e l l e d out the 
r e a l i t y of s u f f e r i n g g l o s s e d over by s o o t h i n g o f f i c i a l p h r a s e s . C r e d i t 
r e s t r i c t i o n would do i t s work of b r i n g i n g down p r i c e s by the r e q u i r e d 10? 
"in no other way than by the de l iberate i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n of unemployment.... 
I t i s a pol icy from which any humane or j ud i c ious person must shr ink . . . No 
s e c t i o n of l abou r w i l l r e a d i l y a c c e p t lower wages merely in r e s p o n s e to 
sen t imenta l speeches, however genuine, by Mr Baldwin. We are depending for 
t h e r e d u c t i o n of wages on the p r e s s u r e of unemployment and of s t r i k e s and 
lockouts . . . " Because of the weak pos i t i on of the coal indus t ry , the miners 
above a l l o t h e r s , would s u f f e r . "They a re the v i c t i m s of t he Economic 
J u g g e r n a u t . They r e p r e s e n t in t h e f l e s h the ' f undamen ta l a d j u s t m e n t s ' 
engineered by the Treasury and the Bank of England to s a t i s f y the impatience 
of t he Ci ty f a t h e r s t o b r i d g e t h e ' m o d e r a t e ' gap between $4.40 and $4 .86 . . . . 
The gold s t a n d a r d , w i th i t s dependence upon pure chance , i t s f a i t h in 
' au tomat ic ad jus tmen t s ' , and i t s general r ega rd le s sness of soc ia l d e t a i l , i s 
an e s s e n t i a l emblem and i d o l of t h o s e who s i t in t h e top t i e r of the 
machine. I th ink they are immensely rash in t h e i r r ega rd l e s snes s , in t h e i r 
vague o p t i m i s m , and c o m f o r t a b l e b e l i e f t h a t no th in g r e a l l y s e r i o u s ever 
h a p p e n s . . . " 
We fee l in these phrases Keynes' f i e r c e indignat ion t h a t ignorance in high 
p l a c e s should impose s u f f e r i n g - a v o i d a b l e s u f f e r i n g . We f e e l h i s 
d e t e r m i n a t i o n to f o r c e to p u b l i c a t t e n t i o n , t o the a t t e n t i o n of t hose 
r e s p o n s i b l e fo r p o l i c y , t he r e a l i t y of t he s i t u a t i o n . C h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y 
a l s o , he o f f e r e d a p l a n . If t he va lue of the £ was to remain as i t was, 
might not an a l t e r n a t i v e to the " h a t e f u l and d i s a s t r o u s " method of fo rced 
de f l a t i on be t r i e d ? He suggested a form of incomes po l icy . "The other way 
i s t o e f f e c t a un i form r e d u c t i o n of wages by agreement (between the 
Government and l a b o u r ) . . . a uni form i n i t i a l r e d u c t i o n of money wages 
throughout the whole range of employment, of (say) 5%, which reduct ion s h a l l 
not hold good u n l e s s , a f t e r an i n t e r v a l , i t has been compensated by a f a l l 
in the cos t of l i v i n g . " 
But t h e Government did not a c t on Keynes' p l a n ; h i s p r e d i c t i o n s of 
i n d u s t r i a l s t r i f e and the d i f f i c u l t y of p r i c e a d j u s t m e n t were f u l l y borne 
out by even ts . The imposi t ion of wage cu t s by the mine owners r e s u l t e d in 
the General S t r i k e of 1926. The ' au tomat ic adjustment ' of wages and p r ices 
was not genera l ly achieved, and the B r i t i s h economy limped through the r e s t 
of t h e t w e n t i e s , an e r a of p r o s p e r i t y e l s e w h e r e , w i t h d e a r money, 
uncompet i t ive p r i c e s and high unemployment. 
The s i m i l a r i t y , m u t a t i s mutandis, of B r i t i s h problems and p o l i c i e s of the 
t w e n t i e s t o t h o s e of t h e e i g h t i e s i s r e m a r k a b l e . As a means of p r i c e 
management, d e f l a t i o n by force may be deemed no l e s s crude and b r u t a l when 
the o b j e c t i s t o modera te a r a t e of p r i c e i n c r e a s e than when i t i s to 
achieve an abso lu te reduct ion of money wages and p r i c e s . 
The Creative Theorist : The General Theory 
Up to the mid - twen t i e s , however unorthodox Keynes' p r a c t i c a l p r e s c r i p t i o n s 
might be , the a n a l y t i c a l t o o l s he employed were e s s e n t i a l l y those he had 
i n h e r i t e d from Marshal l . I t began to be evident to him tha t the t h e o r e t i c a l 
61 
appara tus was not adequate for h i s purposes . The p r ec i s e mechanism by which 
mone ta ry p o l i c y a f f e c t e d a c t i v i t y and p r i c e s was not f u l l y u n d e r s t o o d ; 
publ ic works might have an i n t u i t i v e appeal to common sense as a remedy for 
unemployment , bu t t h e o r y d id no t make c l e a r t h e i r impac t on t h e economy. 
Keynes became involved in a long e f f o r t of t h e o r e t i c a l c o n s t r u c t i o n . I t was 
t o t a k e more t han t en y e a r s t o d e v e l o p h i s new v i s i o n embodied in t he 
General Theory. 
In a n o t h e r way a l s o a new phase was b e g i n n i n g in Keynes ' l i f e . In 1925 he 
marr ied Lydia Lopokova, a prima b a l l e r i n a of the Diaghilev company. Lydia 
(1892-1981) was born in St Pe r t e r sburg and t r a i n e d a t the Imper ia l School of 
B a l l e t ; c u r i o u s l y enough, she t o o , t h r o u g h he r mo the r , had a S c o t t i s h 
connect ion . Of Lydia as an a r t i s t , i t has r ecen t ly been s t a t e d t h a t "beyond 
q u e s t i o n , she was one of t h e g r e a t e s t d a n c e r s of our t i m e " . We have the 
i m p r e s s i o n of a cha rming and l o v a b l e p e r s o n . S i r Geoff rey w r i t e s : "Lydia 
was the most enchant ing f r i end , always bubbling over with high s p i r i t s and 
d e l i g h t f u l nonsense. There are many anecdotes of her (sometimes outrageous) 
r e m a r k s and e c c e n t r i c b e h a v i o u r . She b r o u g h t j oy t o us a l l , e s p e c i a l l y 
Maynard. They were a completely devoted couple ." Mrs Alfred Marshall said 
t h a t m a r r y i n g Lydia was " t h e b e s t t h i n g Maynard ever d id " . But Lydia and 
Bloomsbury d id n o t mix w e l l : Harrod s p e a k s of " o i l and w a t e r " . The 
Bloomsbury f r i e n d s s l i p p e d i n t o t h e background of Keynes ' l i f e . At t h e 
t i m e of h i s m a r r i a g e Keynes l e a s e d , as a c o u n t r y home the farm of T i l t o n , 
under t h e South Downs n e a r Lewes in Sussex . The l a n d s of T i l t o n , he l a t e r 
l e a r n e d , had once been in t h e p o s s e s s i o n of t he Keynes f a m i l y . Farming 
became an enjoyable hobby. 
The T r e a t i s e on Honey - a s u b s t a n t i a l two volume work, t h e f r u i t of f i v e 
y e a r s ' e f f o r t s - appea red in 1930. I t was i n t e n d e d as a d e f i n i t i v e 
e x p o s i t i o n of t h e work ing of a mone ta ry economy b u t , a l t h o u g h c o n t a i n i n g 
much of va lue , turned out t o mark only an i n t e r i m s tage in the development 
of Keynes ' t h o u g h t . I n t e n s i v e e x a m i n a t i o n by Cambridge c o l l e a g u e s and 
c r i t i c i s m from o t h e r q u a r t e r s r e v e a l e d c e r t a i n d e f i c i e n c i e s . W h i l s t t he 
a n a l y s i s of the T r e a t i s e was ev iden t ly intended to comprehend f l u c t u a t i o n s 
of a c t i v i t y and employment in response to changes in demand, Keynes1 formal 
t h e o r e t i c a l model seemed to r e q u i r e the assumption of constancy of ou tput ; 
an adequate theory of unemployment was s t i l l want ing. We may note Professor 
Austin Robinson's comment on Keynes' r eac t ion to the c r i t i c a l response the 
T r e a t i s e r ece ived . 
At no moment i n h i s l i f e , I t h i n k , d i d K e y n e s ' g r e a t n e s s of 
c h a r a c t e r a p p e a r more s t r o n g l y than a t t h i s t i m e . He had j u s t 
c o m p l e t e d what he might r e a s o n a b l y have r e g a r d e d as h i s magnum 
opus . There are few au thors who would not have been sore ly tempted 
to t ake up a p o s i t i o n and to use t h e i r a u t h o r i t y and r e p u t a t i o n to 
main ta in i t u n t i l dis lodged by sheer weight of oppos i t ion . Keynes 
never even appeared to h e s i t a t e . He was off with the r e s t of us in 
p u r s u i t of t r u t h w i t h a s e n t h u s i a s t i c a z e s t a s i f he were 
demolishing the work of h i s worst enemy. 
An i m p o r t a n t c a t a l y s t t o h i s t h o u g h t p r o c e s s was t h e deve lopment of t h e 
" m u l t i p l i e r " by Richard Khan. Keynes again t ak ing the lead i n t e g r a t e d t h i s 
concept i n t o h i s evolving t h e o r e t i c a l fo rmula t ion . Through many d r a f t s the 
c o n s t i t u e n t e l e m e n t s began to f a l l i n t o p l a c e . He h i m s e l f i n d i c a t e d t h e 
s t eps by which h i s unders tanding advanced. 
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.... the most extraordinary thing regarded historically, is the 
complete disappearance of the theory of the demand and supply for 
output as a whole, i.e. the theory of employment, after it had been 
for a quarter of a century the most discussed thing in economics. 
One of the most important transitions for me, after my Treatise on 
Money had been published, was suddenly realising this. It only 
came after I had enunciated to myself the psychological law that, 
when income increases, the gap between income and consumption will 
increase, - a conclusion of vast importance to my own thinking but 
not apparently, expressed just like this, to anyone else's. Then, 
appreciably later, came the notion of interest as being the meaning 
of liquidity preference, which became quite clear in my mind the 
moment I though of it. And last fall, after an immense lot of 
muddling and many drafts, the proper definition of the marginal 
efficiency of capital linked up one thing with another. 
Keynes had no doubts about the fundamental importance of his new conception. 
As the book embodying the new theory - The General Theory - neared 
completion, he described to George Bernard Shaw the effect he expected it to 
have: 
To understand my state of mind.... you have to know that I believe 
myself to be writing a book on economic theory which will largely 
revolutionize - not, I suppose, at once but in the course of the 
next ten years - the way the world thinks about economic problems. 
When my new theory has been assimilated and mixed with politics and 
feeling and passions, I can't predict what the final upshot will be 
in its effect on action and affairs. But there will be a great 
change 
I can't expect you, or anyone else, to believe this at the present 
stage. But for myself I don't merely hope what I say, in my own 
mind I am quite sure. 
Keynes' presentation of his new theory was intentionally provocative -
stressing that orthodox thinking on employment was entangled in confusion 
and error. He deliberately sought "to raise a dust" to force the economics 
profession to attend to his message and to reconsider deeply ingrained 
ideas. 
During these years, despite being engaged with economics, finance and 
journalism, Keynes was able to give time to activities relating to the arts. 
Marriage to Lydia brought him into close touch with the world of ballet. He 
became treasurer of the Camargo Society which kept ballet alive in England 
between the death of Diaghilev and the emergence of the Vic-Wells company. 
He was a principal organiser of the London Artists Association which 
provided security of income to member artists. The Cambridge Arts Theatre 
was his creation. The idea was his, he supplied finance and brought the 
project to completion. Once it was established as a financially viable 
operation Keynes made over the theatre as a gift to a trust formed of 
representative of town and university. He continued to be closely involved 
in the management. The Arts Theatre opened with a gala performance by the 
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V i c - W e l l s b a l l e t on 3 Feb rua ry 1937. The General Theory of Employment, 
I n t e r e s t and Money was publ ished the next day. 
The General Theory was a c o n t r i b u t i o n of the f i r s t importance. i t provided 
a c o n c e p t u a l f ramework in t e r m s of which the n a t u r e and cause of t he 
p r i n c i p a l socio-economic problem of the t ime - mass unemployment - could, 
for the f i r s t t ime , be c l e a r l y unders tood. I t was Keynes' con ten t ion t h a t 
convent iona l t h ink ing had complete ly f a i l e d to understand the phenomenon of 
unemployment , and t h a t t h e s o l u t i o n commonly recommended was h o p e l e s s l y 
i r r e l e v a n t . Accord ing t o t h e c o n v e n t i o n a l wisdom (or as Keynes put i t , 
according to the " c l a s s i c a l theory") unemployment could occur in two forms. 
The two c a t e g o r i e s which t h e t h e o r y i d e n t i f i e d were c o n s i d e r e d compre -
h e n s i v e . 
" F r i c t i o n a l " unemployment was seen as the n a t u r a l accompaniment of change 
w i t h i n t h e economy. Unemployment of t h a t s o r t was u n d e r s t o o d t o be a 
r e f l e c t i o n of the f ac t t h a t adjustment to a d i s tu rbance (such as a change in 
t h e p a t t e r n of demand, or a change in t h e money supp ly ) does not occur 
i n s t a n t a n e o u s l y , but t akes place over t ime . Secondly, any unemployment over 
and above t h a t which could be descr ibed as f r i c t i o n a l was considered to be 
of a k ind which migh t be te rmed ' v o l u n t a r y ' - v o l u n t a r y in t h e sense t h a t 
t h o s e in t h i s c a t e g o r y had only t h e m s e l v e s to b l ame : t h e cause of t h e i r 
b e i n g o u t of work was t h a t they were demanding u n r e a l i s t i c t e r m s of 
employment - a s k i n g f o r h i g h e r r e a l wages than employe r s could a f f o r d to 
pay. The l e v e l of unemployment e x p e r i e n c e d in t h e t w e n t i e s and t h i r t i e s , 
abnormally high by h i s t o r i c a l s t a n d a r d s , was explained on t h a t b a s i s as the 
i n e v i t a b l e c o n s e q u e n c e of t h e "wage p o l i c y " which t h e t r a d e u n i o n s had 
adopted. From t h a t orthodox viewpoint the remedy was thought to be obvious 
- acceptance of lower wages would mean more employment. 
In t h e General Theory Keynes advanced t h e t h e s i s t h a t t h e unemployment of 
the t ime (beyond the unavoidable element of f r i c t i o n a l unemployment) was of 
a c h a r a c t e r not recognised by the c l a s s i c a l theory : the problem as he saw 
i t was e s s e n t i a l l y one, not of "voluntary" unemployment, but of invo luntary 
unemployment . A c o n d i t i o n of i n v o l u n t a r y unemployment could be s a i d t o 
e x i s t when p e o p l e w i l l i n g t o work on p e r f e c t l y r e a l i s t i c t e r m s , t e r m s 
compat ib le wi th t h e i r employment, are unable to find work because not enough 
jobs are of fered by employers . Why should employers not wish to take on a l l 
the labour a v a i l a b l e to them? The amount of employment they offer depends 
on t h e i r e x p e c t a t i o n s as to the amount of output they w i l l be able to s e l l . 
I f demand fo r o u t p u t f a l l s off , demand fo r t he s e r v i c e s of l a b o u r w i l l be 
cor respondingly reduced. 
Keynes ' damning c h a r g e a g a i n s t t he c l a s s i c a l t h e o r y was t h a t i t e n t i r e l y 
overlooked the p o s s i b i l i t y of invo lun ta ry unemployment: i t f a i l e d to al low 
t h a t on o c c a s i o n t o t a l demand for o u t p u t cou ld be l e s s than would i nduce 
employers to take on the whole of the a v a i l a b l e workforce. That f a i l u r e of 
v i s ion was symptomatic of a g rea t gap in the c l a s s i c a l a n a l y s i s : what was 
m i s s i n g , Keynes a r g u e d , was an a d e q u a t e t h e o r y of how t o t a l demand fo r 
o u t p u t i s d e t e r m i n e d . R e l i a n c e had i n s t e a d been p l aced on t h e wool ly 
assumption t h a t - somehow - "supply c r e a t e s i t s own demand", implying t h a t 
t h e marke t w i l l a l w a y s t a k e up w h a t e v e r volume of o u t p u t e n t r e p r e n e u r s 
produce and of fe r for s a l e . 
Having d e m o n s t r a t e d t h e n a t u r e of t h e unemployment problem to be q u i t e 
d i f f e r e n t from what had been supposed, and having revealed the def ic iency of 
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r e c e i v e d d o c t r i n e s , Keynes proceeded in t he General Theory to deve lop the 
r e q u i r e d a n a l y s i s of a g g r e g a t e r e a l demand. Aggregate demand for ou tpu t 
emerged as an i n d e p e n d e n t l y d e t e r m i n e d key v a r i a b l e , not an a u t o m a t i c 
r e f l e c t i o n of the value of aggregate supply. The theory of e f f e c t i v e demand 
e x p l a i n e d , by r e f e r e n c e to t h e behav iou r of i n d i v i d u a l s o p e r a t i n g in r e a l 
world c o n d i t i o n s of u n c e r t a i n t y , t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n of consumpt ion , 
i n v e s t m e n t and t o t a l demand for ou tpu t w i t h i n t h e economy. The a n a l y s i s 
d e m o n s t r a t e d t h a t a g g r e g a t e demand could vary a c c o r d i n g to c i r c u m s t a n c e s 
w i th consequen t e f f e c t s on a c t i v i t y and employment . Keynes made i t c l e a r 
t h a t , when demand was fo r l e s s than t h e f u l l c a p a c i t y o u t p u t of the 
p r o d u c t i v e s y s t e m , t h e economy c o u l d g e t " s t u c k " in a s i t u a t i o n of 
unemployment equ i l i b r ium, with no e f f e c t i v e adjustment forces opera t ing to 
push i t t owards f u l l employment. A case for gove rnmen ta l management of 
aggregate demand was i nd i ca t ed . I t was evident from Keynes' a n a l y s i s t ha t 
the slump condi t ions of the 1930's requi red not wage-cut t ing but s t imu la t i on 
of demand for the output of indus t ry . 
The g e n e r a l t h e o r y was i n t e l l e c t u a l l y c o n v i n c i n g ; i t s " p s y c h o l o g i c a l and 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l r e a l i t y " appea led to common s e n s e , and i t o f f e r e d an 
a n a l y t i c a l apparatus of evident p r a c t i c a l u t i l i t y . Many of the economics 
p r o f e s s i o n came t o a c c e p t Keynes' v i s i o n . But what , i t might be asked 
today, of the ' m o n e t a r i s t ' chal lenge to the ascendancy of Keynesian theory? 
The mone ta r i s t school r e a s s e r t s the ' c l a s s i c a l ' t h e s i s t ha t unemployment can 
only be f r i c t i o n a l or v o l u n t a r y . The i r u n d e r l y i n g t h e o r y i s e s s e n t i a l l y 
p r e - K e y n e s i a n . We f i nd a t heo ry of monetary (not r e a l ) e x p e n d i t u r e 
toge ther with a theory which purpor ts to explain employment by reference to 
c o n d i t i o n s of p r o d u c t i v i t y and l abou r supp ly ; d e v i a t i o n of employment by 
r e f e r e n c e to c o n d i t i o n s of p r o d u c t i v i t y and l abou r supp ly ; d e v i a t i o n of 
employment from i t s ' n a t u r a l ' l e v e l i s s a id to be due to a change in 
monetary spend ing c a u s i n g a change in l a b o u r supply. This con tempora ry 
v e r s i o n of c l a s s i c a l t h e o r y i s as v u l n e r a b l e t o Keynes' c r i t i q u e : they 
proceed in neglect of Keynes' theory . 
The Statesman : War and Post-War Reconstruction 
As t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n w o r s e n e d Keynes spoke out a g a i n s t 
appeasement. "We are su f fe r ing to-day from the worst of a l l d i s e a s e s , the 
p a r a l y s i s of w i l l . Nothing can be more dangerous than t h a t . We have become 
i n c a p a b l e of c o n s t r u c t i v e p o l i c y or d e c i s i v e a c t i o n . We a re w i t h o u t 
convic t ion , without f o r e s i g h t , without a r e so lu t e w i l l to p ro tec t what we 
c a r e f o r . We j u s t rearm a l i t t l e more, g rove l a l i t t l e more, and w a i t to 
s e e what h a p p e n s " (March 1 9 3 8 ) . "The C h r i s t i a n c i v i l i s a t i o n and 
fundamental b a s i s of conduct which our predecessors e s t ab l i shed in a savage 
world" were in danger. He urged a pol icy of "pos i t i ve pacif ism", a policy 
of f i rm c o l l e c t i v e r e s i s t a n c e , by wha teve r means might be a p p r o p r i a t e , to 
f a s c i s t aggress ion . Arrangements to permit the emigrat ion of Jews should be 
made with Germany. 
Keynes appl ied h i s mind to ques t ions of war f inance. A r t i c l e s appeared in 
The Times (and, s t o l e n , in the Frankfurter Zeitung). The economic problem 
which th rea tened was now one of too much ra the r than too l i t t l e demand: the 
t o t a l of c i v i l and m i l i t a r y expendi ture would have to be accommodated to the 
s u p p l i e s which could be made a v a i l a b l e . Keynes a p p l i e d t he c o n c e p t u a l 
apparatus of the General Theory to the new problem. How to Pay for the War 
(February 1940) demonstrated t h a t t axa t ion and compulsory savings (Keynes' 
"deferred pay" scheme) could be used to cons t ra in p r iva t e sector demand and 
so r e l e a s e resources for the war e f f o r t . 
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When Winston Church i l l took charge in May 1940, Keynes was brought back i n to 
Whi t eha l l . His p o s i t i o n was not t h a t of a s a l a r i e d o f f i c i a l ; i t was as an 
(unpaid) exper t consu l t an t - though he was to become much more than t h a t -
t h a t he was g iven a desk in t h e T r e a s u r y . His i n f l u e n c e was q u i c k l y f e l t 
in domest ic economic management. Treatment of government expendi tu res and 
revenues as e lements of the t o t a l macroeconomic balance replaced previous 
concen t r a t i on on the government 's own accounts as the b a s i s of formula t ion 
of f i s c a l p o l i c y . The 1941 B u d g e t was f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e c a s t in 
"Keynes ian" t e r m s , r e c o g n i s i n g t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s of t h e g o v e r n m e n t ' s 
budgetary p o s i t i o n for the s t a t e of the economy as a whole. A fundamental 
advance had t a k e n p l a c e . The 1944 White Paper on Employment P o l i c y 
e x p r e s s e d a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of o f f i c i a l a t t i t u d e s . The message of t h e 
G e n e r a l Theory had been abso rbed - and in l e s s than Keynes1 t en y e a r s . 
Unemployment was r e c o g n i s e d as an a v o i d a b l e e v i l , an e v i l a g a i n s t which 
p r e v e n t i v e or c o r r e c t i v e a c t i o n s h o u l d , and c o u l d , be t a k e n . The 1946 
Employment P r o t e c t i o n Act marked a s i m i l a r c o n v e r s i o n of Uni ted S t a t e s 
op in ion . 
The s u g g e s t i o n i s s o m e t i m e s e n c o u n t e r e d t h a t blame fo r the i n f l a t i o n a r y 
c o n d i t i o n s from which the Western world has r e c e n t l y been su f fe r ing should 
be l a i d a t Keynes' door. Post-war governments, i t i s a l l e g e d , were misled 
by Keynes ian i d e a s t o n e g l e c t t h e i n f l a t i o n a r y i m p l i c a t i o n s of t h e 
employment o b j e c t i v e s they adopted. Although during the war yea r s Keynes' 
a t t e n t i o n was p r i m a r i l y d i r e c t e d t o i s s u e s o t h e r than i n t e r n a l p o s t - w a r 
problems, he did g ive some i n d i c a t i o n of h i s t h ink ing on domestic m a t t e r s . 
Keynes c e r t a i n l y a p p r e c i a t e d t h a t a t t a i n m e n t of t he o b j e c t i v e of f u l l 
employment would c r e a t e a problem of wage c o n t r o l . He warned (1943) t h a t 
s t a b i l i t y of p r i c e s would r e q u i r e the s t a b i l i s a t i o n of money wages. "Some 
c o u n t r i e s " he o b s e r v e d " a r e l i k e l y to be more s u c c e s s f u l than o t h e r s in 
p r e s e r v i n g s t a b i l i t y of i n t e r n a l p r i c e s . . . . A communist c o u n t r y i s in a 
p o s i t i o n to be very succe s s fu l . Some people argue t h a t a c a p i t a l i s t country 
i s doomed t o f a i l u r e b e c a u s e i t w i l l be found i m p o s s i b l e in c o n d i t i o n s of 
f u l l employment t o p r e v e n t a p r o g r e s s i v e i n c r e a s e of wages . Acording t o 
t h i s view s e v e r e s lumps and r e c u r r e n t p e r i o d s of unemployment have been 
h i t h e r t o t h e only means of h o l d i n g e f f i c i e n c y wages w i t h i n a r e a s o n a b l y 
s t a b l e r a n g e . Whether t h i s i s so r e m a i n s to be s e e n . The more c o n s c i o u s 
we are of t h i s problem, the l i k e l i e r we s h a l l be to surmount i t . " 
I t was w i t h m a t t e r s of e x t e r n a l f i n a n c e t h a t Keynes, in t h e Second, as in 
the F i r s t World War, was p r i n c i p a l l y concerned. He played the major r o l e on 
the B r i t i s h s ide in Anglo-American n e g o t i a t i o n s over war f inance and pos t -
war r e c o n s t r u c t i o n . He was not a mere t e c h n i c a l adv i se r . In the formation 
and conduct of B r i t a i n ' s i n t e r n a t i o n a l economic po l i cy , h i s p a r t was t h a t of 
a s t a t e sman . 
P res iden t Rooseve l t ' s announcement of Lend-Lease in January 1941 - a l lowing 
B r i t a i n to buy "on t i c k " war m a t e r i a l s f o r which we had no means of paying -
r e l i eve d for the du ra t ion of the war the t h r e a t of f i n a n c i a l d i s a s t e r . Even 
so, t h e r e were s t i l l f i n a n c i a l m a t t e r s t o be s e t t l e d between B r i t a i n and the 
Uni ted S t a t e s . The scope of Lease-Lend had t o be d e t e r m i n e d in d e t a i l , 
t h e r e was the ma t t e r of B r i t i s h indebtedness for pre-Lend-Lease s u p p l i e s and 
the ques t ion of B r i t a i n ' s a b i l i t y to pay. In May 1941 Keynes (and Lydia) 
f lew to t h e S t a t e s ; t h i s was t h e f i r s t of s i x t r a n s a t l a n t i c v i s i t s they 
were to make between 1941 and 1946. Very f u l l d i s cus s ions took place wi th 
o f f i c i a l s of t h e US T r e a s u r y . Keynes gave t h e Amer icans a c o m p r e h e n s i v e 
p i c t u r e of the B r i t i s h s i t u a t i o n . "From t h a t t ime forward" Harrod observes , 
" t he r e was a much more i n t e l l i g e n t a p p r a i s a l of B r i t a i n ' s problems from the 
American s i d e " . P o s t - w a r c o n d i t i o n s and t h e q u e s t i o n of t h e u l t i m a t e 
s e t t l e m e n t of Lend-Lease o b l i g a t i o n s came under d i s cus s ion ; i t emerged t h a t 
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American thinking was developing along the lines that Britain's obligations 
might be cancelled in exchange for an undertaking to co-operate in the 
elimination of trade restrictions. The discriminatory character of the 
system of Imperial Preference was a particularly sore point in the United 
States. Keynes took the American suggestion back to London.It should be 
understood that during the war years Keynes was far from fit. In 1937 he 
suffered a serious heart attack. He never fully recovered; thereafter, 
Harrod says, "his life hung by a thread". He suffered other attacks. 
Lydia guarded and supported him, accompanying him, despite Admiralty 
objections, on all his American missions. 
Keynes* assessment of the situation was that, while free trade would be in 
itself a good thing, Britain could move in that direction only in the 
context of a post-war settlement which took account of the balance of 
payments problem she would face. He saw, as the pre-requisite of movement 
towards greater freedom of international trade, the necessity of 
constructive reorganisation of the international monetary system. 
We need a means of reassurance to a troubled world, by which any 
country whose own affairs are conducted with due prudence is 
relieved of anxiety for causes which are not of its own making, 
concerning its ability to meet its international liabilities; and 
which will, therefore, make unnecessary those methods of 
restriction and discrimination which countries have adopted 
hitherto, not on their merits, but as measures of self protection 
from disruptive outside forces. 
He proposed an international "Clearing Union". This "grand and daring" 
conception was, after much discussion, and with some modification, adopted 
as the official British plan. The object of the "Keynes Plan" was to create 
an international system which would permit countries with balance of 
payments difficulties sufficient freedom of manoeuvre to tackle their 
problems without resort to damaging crisis measures of deflation or trade 
restriction. 
The Clearing Union which Keynes proposed would act as a bank to its member 
countries -a central bank for central bankers. A new international money, 
in the form of deposits with the Clearing Union, would come into being. 
These deposits would be denominated in units of "bancor", of which the value 
in relation to gold would be specified. Payments between member countries 
would be cleared through the Union. Countries with a balance of payments 
surplus would receive credits to their accounts with the Union; countries 
with deficits would receive debits. Permitted overdrafts on accounts with 
the Union would constitute an addition to the stock of international means 
of payment. Some access to overdraft facilities was to be automatic, but, 
beyond a certain point further drawing would require the approval of the 
authorities of the Clearing Union, who could require a deficit country to 
take corrective action. Pressure would be put on surplus countries, 
interest would be charged on credit balances above a certain level,and after 
a certain time,such balances could be cancelled. The credit creating 
capability of the Union was to be readily adjustable to the needs of trade 
and the objective of achieving stability of demand and activity. The plan 
envisaged stable exchange rates, alterable at the request of the Union and, 
in some degree, also at the discretion of member countries. Keynes had 
hopes that, if the Clearing Union came into being , its functions might in 
time be extended - it might for instance operate to stabilize commodity 
prices; it might ultimately become "the pivot of the future economic 
government of the world". 
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Almost a t t h e same t i m e (summer 1942) a s t h e Keynes Plan was r e v e a l e d to t h e 
US a u t h o r i t i e s , Keynes was in formed of an i n d e p e n d e n t l y d e v i s e d American 
scheme - t h e White Plan ( a f t e r Harry Dexter White of t he US T r e a s u r y , i t s 
a u t h o r ) . The o b j e c t i v e s of t h e White Plan were s i m i l a r t o t h o s e of t he 
Keynes Plan. I t offered an " I n t e r n a t i o n a l S t a b i l i z a t i o n Fund with resources 
and powers adequate to the t a sk of he lp ing to achieve monetary s t a b i l i t y and 
f a c i l i t a t e t h e r e s t o r a t i o n and b a l a n c e d growth of i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r a d e " . 
The proposed scheme was, however, much l e s s ambi t ious than t h a t of Keynes. 
The p r o p o s a l was for a Fund t o which members would c o n t r i b u t e means of 
payment and on which, with permiss ion , they could draw; the Fund was not a 
bank w i t h t h e power t o c r e a t e a new form of i n t e r n a t i o n a l money. There 
would be no a u t o m a t i c a c c e s s to t he Fund, p r e s s u r e on s u r p l u s c o u n t r i e s 
would be l e s s than under the r u l e s of the Keynes Plan, and the p o t e n t i a l for 
fu tu re development of the S t a b i l i z a t i o n Fund was fa r l e s s than t h a t of the 
Clear ing Union. Fur thermore , the American plan was on a much smal le r s ca l e 
than the B r i t i s h - i t envisaged i n i t i a l r e sources of $8 b i l l i o n , as aga in s t 
Keynes' f i g u r e of $25 b i l l i o n . 
The two Plans were assessed in London and in Washington. The Americans made 
a s u b s t a n t i a l concess ion to the B r i t i s h by in t roduc ing a "scarce currency" 
c lause a l lowing t r a d e d i s c r i m i n a t i o n a g a i n s t a p e r s i s t e n t c r e d i t o r country . 
I t was d e c i d e d t h a t t h e a u t h o r s of t h e r i v a l p l a n s should c o n f r o n t each 
o t h e r . They met in Washing ton in September 1943. There was, Harrod 
r e p o r t s , "an open c l a sh of w i l l and p e r s o n a l i t y . " White would not go beyond 
what he c o n s i d e r e d would be a c c e p t a b l e to Congres s ; by t h a t c r i t e r i o n he 
could n o t a c c e p t t h e Keynes Plan - i t would appear too gene rous to d e b t o r 
c o u n t r i e s , t oo i n f l a t i o n a r y in p o t e n t i a l . I t was a q u e s t i o n of p o l i t i c a l 
r e a l i s m - ha l f a loa f would be b e t t e r than none. Keynes had to y i e l d . I t 
was ag reed t h a t Keynes shou ld t a k e t h e White Plan as a b a s i s and make such 
amendments as he saw f i t . The document which was f i n a l l y agreed could be 
d e s c r i b e d as a l i b e r a l i z e d v e r s i o n of t he White Plan fo r a S t a b i l i z a t i o n 
Fund. 
In July 1944 f o r t y - f o u r na t i ons convened a t Bret ton Woods, New Hampshire, to 
examine the Anglo-American proposa l s and to determine the f i n a l c o n s t i t u t i o n 
of t h e o f f s p r i n g of t h e Keynes-Whi te n e g o t i a t i o n s , t he I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
Monetary Fund. The same was to be done fo r t he I n t e r n a t i o n a l Bank fo r 
R e c o n s t r u c t i o n and Deve lopment , t he e s t a b l i s h m e n t of which had a l s o been 
agreed in the prev ious months. All amendments proposed by a l l na t i ons had 
to be cons ide red . Professor Lord Robbins, who was presen t as a member of 
t h e B r i t i s h d e l e g a t i o n , r e c o r d e d h i s i m p r e s s i o n of Keynes in a c t i o n 
( a c t u a l l y a t a p r e l im ina ry conference in A t l a n t i c City immediately p r io r to 
the Bre t ton Woods conference proper) . 
In the l a t e af ternoon we had a j o i n t sess ion with the Americans . . . 
Keynes was in h i s most l u c i d and p e r s u a s i v e mood; and t h e e f f e c t 
was i r r e s i s t i b l e . At such moments, I o f t e n f i nd myse l f t h i n k i n g 
t h a t Keynes must be one of t h e most r e m a r k a b l e men t h a t have ever 
l ived - the quick l o g i c , the b i r d l i k e swoop of i n t u i t i o n , the vivid 
f a n c y , t h e wide v i s i o n , above a l l t h e i n c o m p a r a b l e s ense of t he 
f i t n e s s of w o r d s , a l l combine to make someth ing s e v e r a l d e g r e s s 
beyond the l i m i t of o rd inary human achievement. I t as pure genius . 
After t h r ee weeks of i n t e n s i v e d i scuss ion and d r a f t i n g a t Bret ton Woods, the 
b u s i n e s s was c o m p l e t e . As Keynes b rough t t h e c o n f e r e n c e t o a c l o s e , t h e 
d e l e g a t e s rose in a s tanding ova t ion . Professor Robbins observed: 
In a way, t h i s i s one of the g r e a t e s t t r i u m p h s of h i s l i f e . 
Scrupulously obedient to h i s i n s t r u c t i o n s , b a t t l i n g aga ins t f a t i gue 
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and weakness, he has throughout dominated the Conference. 
What had Keynes achieved? The IMF was to be a more limited instrument than 
that envisaged in his original plan. It may indeed be true that "there can 
be little doubt, particularly in the light of subsequent events, that on 
economic grounds the Keynes Plan was superior to its fellow"; but if 
Keynes, with his great power of persuasion could not get more from the 
Americans, the Bretton Woods system was very likely the best that in the 
circumstances could be achieved. It was a beginning. If Britain had not, 
as under Keynes' guidance she did, adopted an internationalist approach and 
had not pushed for a dramatic scheme of international monetary reform, not 
even the Bretton Woods system, perhaps not any rational improvement at all 
of the international monetary system, would have been achieved. 
Even with his demanding wartime responsibilities Keynes managed to find time 
for the arts. Before the war, he had deplored the fact that, while in other 
times and other places public patronage of the arts had been taken for 
granted, in contemporary Britain "we have persuaded ourselves that it is 
particularly wicked for the state to spend a halfpenny for non-economic 
purposes". From 1942 he was actually engaged in the disbursement of public 
money to the arts. In that year he accepted the chairmanship of the 
Committee for the Encouragement of Music and the Arts. CEMA, as it is 
generally known, had been set up earlier in the war originally under private 
auspices later to contribute on the home front by providing, to "hard 
pressed and often exiled civilians", opportunities for enjoyment of the 
arts. CEMA brought music, drama and exhibitions to factories, wartime 
hostels, mining villages. It offered opportunities to artists; a system of 
subsidies came into being. Keynes wrote: "We seek, increasingly, to aid 
all those who pursue the highest standard of original composition and 
executive performance in all branches of the Arts." 
From CEMA there developed, as a permanent peacetime institution, the Arts 
Council, of which Keynes has been described as the architect. In a famous 
broadcast he spoke of the Council, its policy and its hopes. "At last, the 
public exchequer has recognised the support and encouragement of the 
civilising arts of life as part of their duty." He went on to explain: 
"We want ... to encourage local institutions and societies and local 
enterprise to take the lead.. . In Glasgow, in particular, the work of the 
Citizens Theatre is a perfect model of what we would like to see established 
everywhere, with their own playrights, their own company and an ever-growing 
and more appreciative local public... Certainly in every blitzed town in 
this country one hopes that the local authority will make provision of a 
central group of buildings for drama and music and art. There would be no 
better memorial of a war to save the freedom of the spirit of the 
individual..." He was to have been the first chairman of the Arts Council. 
Keynes was hardly back from Bretton Woods before he returned to Washington 
as deputy for the Chancellor to negotiate the terms of Lend-Lease for the 
period (how short it would be was not of course known) of continuing warfare 
against Japan after victory in Europe. This involved two months of 
protracted and hard fought negotiations, concerning not only broad 
principles but as well minutest items of detail. The next year the 
unexpectedly rapid conclusion of the war in the Far East precipitated a 
financial crisis for Britain. The Lend-Lease arrangements came abruptly to 
an end. Britain was in no position to pay her way or pay her debts. It was 
not conceivably possible to quadruple exports overnight as would have been 
required to maintain imports of food and materials in the absence of renewed 
assistance. Keynes was back in Washington with all speed to rescue the 
situation. It took him three days to present the British case. "Those 
most sympathetic and those least sympathetic agreed in thinking that this 
was the finest exposition to which they had ever listened, or were ever 
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likely to listen." He brought back not the outright gift which he had 
hoped for, but a loan on generous terms and cancellation of all potential 
obligations in respect of Lend-Lease. Having fought for the Loan in 
Washington he had to fight for its acceptance at Westminster. His defence 
of the terms of the Loan in the House of Lords the day after his return from 
Washington was a notable triumph. 
Early in 1946 Keynes crossed the Atlantic yet again. He was to attend the 
inaugural meeting at Savannah of the IMF and the World Bank, to both of 
which he had been appointed British Governor. Unexpected difficulties 
arose: the conference turned out to be a battle, not the pleasant occasion 
he had anticipated. To his dismay the Americans, apparently abandoning 
internationalism for self-interest, were intent on forcing on the conference 
their own plans for the location and direction of the IMF and the Bank. 
Keynes feared American political domination of the new institutions. He 
fought desperately but to no avail for arrangements which would minimise 
political influence. 
En route from Savannah to Washington he collapsed on the train. It was the 
worst attack he had had. At home in England, at Tilton, early on 21 April 
- Easter Day 1946 - he suffered another attack. This time there was no 
recovery. 
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